Value-added science by Alexandrova, Anna
Value-Added Science
Anna Alexandrova on value judgements and the measurement of well-being
Let me say ﬁrst what I mean by ‘value judgement’. Take the central tasks of science to be building
theories—general claims about the world—and explanations—illuminating applications of theories
to speciﬁc phenomena. These two activities inevitably push scientists beyond the facts they, or
those before them, have observed. This is because facts do not uniquely compel a theory, and
phenomena do not uniquely compel which theory applies to them. If there is a gap between facts
on the one hand and theory and explanations on the other, something closes that gap when a
theory or an explanation is adopted. Philosophers have long observed that this role can be played
by judgements about what is the simplest, the most compelling, the most elegant, or the most
general theory or explanation. In a sense, these are value judgements, but I mean something
different: judgements about what is good, virtuous, wholesome, and fair—judgements that are
moral, political, or prudential. So should we trust a science that makes value judgements?
If we didn’t allow any value judgement in science, we’d be tiresome sceptics; theorizing and
explanation-building inevitably come with the baggage that plugs the gap between facts and
theories. Without what philosophers call ‘epistemic values’—simplicity, elegance, generality, and
so on—science would be just a collection of facts (if even that). However, values about how we
should live seem somehow more easily avoided and less essential to science. Though many
people are willing to allow that morals and politics can regulate the pursuit of science—which
problems get studied, at what cost, and with what constraints—it does not seem like scientiﬁc
knowledge itself presupposes value judgements. A government-funded genetics project is not
necessarily a statement about how we should live; or, at most, it is so only indirectly. But
government-funded research about happy cities, or mental health among soldiers, or the dynamics
of poverty, or the suffering of refugees, I hope you’ll agree, sound different. Why? Because in
those cases, the very object of research—well-being, health, happiness, suffering—requires as
part of its deﬁnition a value judgement about what is good, fair, or right. We aren’t only saying that
these are the things worth studying, but also taking a stand on what is to be well, to suffer, to be
healthy, to be free, and so on. Pursuit of that kind of science engages questions that are normally
within the scope of ethics, politics, and theories of good life.
Nothing seems to me as tantalizing as philosophy of social sciences: the study of whether and
how it is possible to turn the scientiﬁc eye onto ourselves as individuals or communities. But this
particular puzzle caught my attention when I came across scientiﬁc claims such as the following:
Happiness is not always conducive to well-being
Long commutes are associated with lower well-being
Early learning difﬁculties have a disproportionate impact on life well-being
I discovered a ﬁeld within today’s social sciences and medicine that calls itself the science of well-
being. As I got to know this ﬁeld, it struck me that these scientists are, for the most part, regular,
bona ﬁde empiricists, doing everything normal scientists do: testing hypotheses, building models,
measuring phenomena, respecting facts. But in being such normal scientists, they also make what
seem like profoundly value-laden (or ‘normative’) judgements:
If positive emotions get in the way of seeing reality, they take away from well-being
Even if people willingly choose to have longer commutes, they hurt themselves
A child that does not develop her capacities is not ﬂourishing
When I tried to ﬁt the science of well-being within the philosophy of science that I knew, I
encountered problems. By the time I started thinking about this ten years ago, philosophers of
science were more accepting of the role of values in science, at least as compared to earlier in the
ﬁeld’s history. They were discussing values as arbiters of theories when facts aren’t enough (this is
called ‘under-determination’), they discovered ways in which values determine the level of
evidence required to accept or reject a hypothesis (this is called ‘inductive risk’), they wrote
compellingly about the responsibility of scientists to research topics that affect the most people,
rather than just the richest (there isn’t a name for this duty).
But none of these phenomena ﬁt my case. The science of well-being presents a new kind of value-
ladenness. I started by deﬁning the phenomenon and giving it a somewhat prosaic name: ‘mixed
claims’.
A mixed claim is an empirical claim in which at least one variable is deﬁned in a way thatpresupposes a moral, prudential, or political value judgement about the nature of this variable.
I called them ‘mixed’ because such claims mix the factual and the normative.
Now I wanted to know whether mixed claims are legitimate in science. I found that when other
philosophers noted ‘mixedness’, they seemed embarrassed by it. Ernst Nagel wrote that when
faced with apparent mixedness (though he didn’t call it that), we should pry apart the normative
content from the factual and only keep the factual in science. The normative is none of scientists’
business. Take my previous example, ‘Happiness is not always conducive to well-being’. Nagel
would argue that the proper concern of science is only the following claim:
If well-being is understood as good functioning across many domains and over the course ofour lives, then happiness can impede well-being.
This conditional does not take a stand on what well-being is; it only pursues the empirical
consequences of deﬁning well-being in terms of lifetime functioning.
I appreciated Nagel’s concerns, namely, that normative claims are too important to be left to
science, and mixed science can be ideological, compromising the authority and neutrality of
science. But I hated the division of labour that his picture implied: scientists take care of facts,
while values are left to… who? Nagel didn’t say, but perhaps the democratic process? This neat
division seemed suspicious, because the more I learned about the science of well-being, the more
I saw that choices about values permeate the ﬁeld, through and through. Suppose you want to
measure whether people are satisﬁed with their lives. Do you just ask them? What if they are not
truthful, or not sincere, or not serious? You might try to create conditions that would make their
judgements more authoritative, such as giving them anonymity, or time and space for serious
reﬂection and authenticity. But what counts as serious reﬂection? What counts as authenticity?
These are value judgements themselves and it seems comical to stop scientists from making
them, or to send them running to whoever is the authority on values.
Not only is the Nagelian arrangement messy, it is also dismissive of scientiﬁc knowledge.
Dismissive because (and here was a moment of epiphany for me) some scientiﬁc knowledge is
about values! I owe this epiphany to reading the work of Elizabeth Anderson. She observed that
when feminist sociologists started studying divorce, they adopted different methods than previous
scientists. They allowed for the fact that divorce can be an opportunity for growth as well as a
trauma, and thus discovered new empirical facts about the consequences of divorce. Being
feminist may change your perspective, but it does not give you license to ignore facts, which these
scientists didn’t. Similarly, it seems entirely uncontroversial that a child psychologist knows that
institutionalization is bad for children (a normative claim), because she has seen what living in
orphanage does to young children (a factual claim). So values and facts can be entangled without
fraud or bias. Why didn’t I think of it before, I wondered?
After this breakthrough, I didn’t look back. I knew that mixed claims could be epistemically
legitimate. But my job wasn’t over yet. I had seen some dark and problematic trends developing in
the science of well-being. Here’s an example: Some psychologists (call them ‘hedonists’) succeed
impressively in the awesome task of detecting the positive and negative emotions of their subjects.
They called the ratio of one to the other ‘happiness’, and argued that it measured true happiness
or well-being, and that policy should aim at improving this ratio. When others objected that people
report and behave as if other things besides happiness matter too—meaning, autonomy,
achievement, status—the hedonists sometimes replied with dangerous lack of moral awareness
that those other things are just biases, and that true well-being is only what’s experienced. This is
not a dig at psychologists; economists sometimes behave as if their way of detecting value (by
willingness to pay) is correct by deﬁnition too.
I saw the debate between hedonists, traditional economists, and psychologists of a non-hedonist
persuasion play out in the public sphere in 2010, when the Ofﬁce of National Statistics  was
formulating a measure of the UK’s national well-being. Different scholars advocated different
questionnaires based in part on their views about the nature of well-being. As far as I could tell, the
ONS handled that debate rather well: different parties were heard, and the resulting measure—
though clunky and inelegant—does a decent job of reﬂecting the variety of answers to the big
question, namely, what is it for our community to be well?
This example, plus other trends in political theory and philosophy of science, led me to propose
that mixed claims are legitimate, and can even be objective, when they are properly vetted. I
proposed three rules for such vetting. First, scientists should make explicit the values presupposed
by mixed claims. They shouldn’t just collect a bunch of indicators and call them ‘child well-being’,
or ‘freedom’, and so on. They must own up to the value judgements that underlie their choice of
measurement instruments. Secondly, they must check whether the empirical claim they are
pursuing is subject to disagreement on the basis of values. Unemployment, evidence indicates,
hurts all aspects of a person’s life and so the hard debate on the precise nature of well-being can
perhaps be avoided. But often things are trickier. For example, greater earnings predict greater
satisfaction with life but not greater emotional happiness. What matters more for well-being: how
you feel or how you think you are doing relative to others? If scientists wish to make a claim that
takes a stand on this question, and this is my third rule, the claim will be objective only to the
extent that a given measure of well-being passes a deliberative test. I think of this test as a public
debate, though sometimes it might only be hypothetical, in which the relative advantages of
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different measures of well-being are heard and the perspectives of both experts and the public
whose lives could be affected by the choice are included.
Some scientists will be averse to my proposal because it forces them to be philosophers, to make
and to defend value judgements. To them I reply that they face a choice between staking their
identities as scientists on not being philosophers on the one hand, and making their hard-earned
knowledge objective and trustworthy on the other. I hope they choose the latter.
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